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one asserting jurisdiction.Y Although alleviated by the inference of
authorization, that burden probably should not be sustained
where, for example, a defendant presents evidence that the secre-
tary spoke untruthfully or negligently or that the secretary's supe-
rior acted without authority in permitting him to accept service.2
As a practical matter, the process server may not know at the time
of service whether the secretary has been authorized, regardless of
what the secretary tells him,2 and thus will still be required to
make a reasonable and diligent effort to ensure service upon a
proper person." Accordingly, it appears that Sullivan Realty will
not encourage careless service of process, but may help prevent se-




CPLR 902: Court of Appeals refuses to grant class certification fol-
lowing summary judgment
CPLR 902 places the burden upon the complainant to seek
class certification of his action within 60 days following the expira-
2 Jacobs v. Zurich Ins. Co., 53 App. Div. 2d 524, 384 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1st Dep't 1976);
Slotnick v. Campanile, 47 App. Div. 2d 536, 363 N.Y.S.2d 614 (2d Dep't 1975), aff'd, 38
N.Y.2d 986, 348 N.E.2d 911, 384 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1976); Saratoga Harness Racing Ass'n v.
Moss, 26 App. Div. 2d 486, 275 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep't 1966), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 733, 229
N.E.2d 620, 283 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1967); CPLR § 306 (1972 & Supp. 1979-1980).
2 In Fashion Page, the court indicated that the plaintiff should allege in his complaint
whether or not the secretary had been authorized; whether he told the truth about having
the authority to accept the service; what the officer did; and what the corporation did be-
sides moving to vacate the service. 69 App. Div. 2d at 788, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
n The existence of an agency cannot depend merely on "agent's" assertion of authority
absent some manifestation on the part of the corporation which creates the appearance of
authority, see RESTAT~mrr (SEcoND) OF AGENcy § 8 (1958) (apparent authority); id. § 8 B
(estoppel), or by later ratification of the agent's act, id. § 82; see note 2 supra. Thus, the
courts have refused to uphold service merely on the basis of a secretary's statement to the
process server that she could accept the summons. See Coler v. Pittsburgh Bridge Co., 146
N.Y. 281, 40 N.E. 779 (1895); B & J Bakery, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 21
App. Div. 2d 783, 250 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d Dep't 1964); Loeb v. Star & Herald Co., 187 App.
Div. 175, 175 N.Y.S. 412 (1st Dep't 1919). CPLR 311(1) does not indicate the agents of the
corporation that have the power to appoint an agent for service of process, but it appears
that a managing agent is unable to make such an appointment. See Isaf v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 32 App. Div. 2d 578, 299 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1969).
0 See McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 115-16, 238 N.E.2d 726, 728, 291
N.Y.S.2d 328, 332 (1968); note 2 supra.
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tion of the time for the defendant to serve responsive pleadings .31
Class status may be granted only upon a finding by the court that
the requirements under CPLR 901 have been met.32 Recently, in
1, CPLR 902 (1976) provides in relevant part:
Within sixty days after the time to serve a responsive pleading has expired for all
. . defendants in an action brought as a class action, the plaintiff shall move for an
order to determine whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this section
may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the
merits on the court's own motion or on motion of the parties. . . . Among the
matters which the court shall consider in determining whether the action may pro-
ceed as a class action are:
1. The interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions;
2. The impracticability or inefficiency of prosecuting or defending separate
actions;
3. The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class;
4. The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claim in
the particular forum;
5. The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
Replacing CPLR 1005, ch. 308, § 1, [1962] N.Y. Laws 1316 (McKinney), article 9 of the
CPLR was enacted in 1975 to modernize class action procedures to allow greater use of the
class form. See Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 207, N.Y. Laws (June 17, 1975),
reprinted in [1975] N.Y. Laws 1748 (McKinney). CPLR 1005 had been construed as limiting
class actions to situations where privity existed between class members. See, e.g., Society
Milion Athena, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 292-93, 22 N.E.2d 374, 377
(1939). As a result of this privity requirement, class actions in New York could only be
brought in litigations involving trusts, partnerships or joint ventures, and ownership of cor-
porate stock. 2 WK&M $ 901.02. This limitation of class actions was widely criticized. See,
e.g., Farrell, Civil Practice, 1974 Survey of N.Y Law, 26 SYRAcusE L. REv. 365, 388 (1975);
Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 618 (1971).
The 1975 legislation was intended to accomplish two major goals:
1. to set up a flexible scheme whereby class actions could qualify without the
present undesirable and socially detrimental restrictions; and
2. to prescribe basic guidelines for judicial management of class actions.
THIRTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1975), in TWENTY-FiRST ANN.
REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 248 (1976). Initial reactions to the passage of article 9 were
favorable. See Farrell, Civil Practice, 1975 Survey of N.Y Law, 27 SYRACusE L. REv. 425
(1976); Homburger, The 1975 New York Judicial Conference Package: Class Actions and
Comparative Negligence, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 415, 415-30 (1976); The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 179, 189 (1975). The new class action procedure was heralded as an effective tool to
aid in the protection of consumers, Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 207, N.Y.
Laws (June 17, 1975), reprinted in [1975] N.Y. LAWS 1748 (McKinney), since class actions
permit many individuals with small claims to pursue those claims at minimal expense. See
SIEGEL § 139, at 173. Notwithstanding the modernity and flexibility of article 9, some ques-
tions remain as to the full breadth of the statute. 43 ALBANY L. REv. 388, 395 (1979).
" CPLR 901 (1976) provides:
a. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all if:
1. the class is so numerous that joinder of all members, whether otherwise re-
quired or permitted, is impracticable;
[Vol. 54:382
19801 SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
O'Hara v. Del Bello, 3 the Court of Appeals refused to permit certi-
fication of a class action following a pre-trial decision on the merits
in favor of the petitioner, notwithstanding that the time period for
seeking class certification had not yet begun to run."
O'Hara, a reporter in Supreme Court, Westchester County, in-
itiated an Article 78 proceeding35 "on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated" to recover payment for travel vouchers
allegedly owed to them by county officials." Rather than filing an
answer, the respondents moved to dismiss the action for failure to
state a cause of action.3 Without notifying the parties, special term
treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to CPLR 3211(c) .3  The court then ordered the respon-
2. there are questions of law or fact common to the class which predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members;
3. the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class;
4. the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class; and
5. a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.
b. Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure of
recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class action, an action to
recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by statute
may not be maintained as a class action.
These requirements and those contained in CPLR 902 were not intended to represent an
exclusive list of matters to be considered by a court in determining whether to certify a
class. 2 WK&M T 902.10. To prevent unnecessary hardship on either side, a court may re-
fuse class action certification if the merits of the case indicate one side would be disadvan-
taged by such certification. Id. At least one commentator has expressed fear that this could
lead a court, when determining the class action certification issue, into an unwarranted con-
sideration of the merits. Farrell, Civil Practice, 1975 Survey of N.Y Law, 27 SvcsE L.
Rh'v. 425, 426 (1976).
It has been suggested that while article 9 was intended to liberalize the availability of
class actions, see note 31 supra, little success in this regard has been achieved. 43 AIaANY L.
REv. 388, 395 (1979). For example, New York courts have suggested that class action certifi-
cation should not be conferred in cases involving governmental operations. See Martin v.
Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 346 N.E.2d 794, 382 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1976); Long Island College Hosp.
v. Whalen, 68 App. Div. 2d 274, 416 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3rd Dep't 1979). This sentiment had been
expressed by courts prior to the enactment of article 9. See, e.g., Rivera v. Trimarco, 36
N.Y.2d 747, 329 N.E.2d 661, 368 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1975).
- 47 N.Y.2d 363, 391 N.E.2d 1311, 418 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1979).
" Id. at 368-69, 391 N.E.2d at 1313-14, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37.
31 CPLR art. 78 (1976).
347 N.Y.2d at 366, 391 N.E.2d at 1312, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
" Id.; see CPLR 3211(a)(7) (1976). The respondent also made a motion to dismiss under
CPLR 3211(a)(2), challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. 47 N.Y.2d at 366,
391 N.E.2d at 1312, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
u 47 N.Y.2d at 366, 391 N.E.2d at 1312, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 335. CPLR 3211(c) authorizes
a court, after giving adequate notice to the parties, to treat a 3211(a) motion to dismiss as a
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dents to pay the travel vouchers submitted by the members of the
potential class, even though no formal decision had been made
concerning whether the case could proceed as a class action. 9 Fol-
lowing reargument, special term adhered to its prior determina-
tion." The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed.41
A divided Court of Appeals modified the order of the appellate
division by limiting the relief granted to the named petitioner. 42
Judge Jones, who wrote the majority opinion, 4 maintained that the
benefits of the summary judgment award could not be extended
beyond the petitioner, since the trial court had never decided
whether a class action was appropriate." Nor could the case be re-
manded for a consideration of class action status, declared the
motion for summary judgment. CPLR 3211(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
47 N.Y.2d at 366, 391 N.E.2d at 1312, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
Id. at 367, 391 N.E.2d at 1313, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 336. The defendants sought reargu-
ment on the grounds that the court had failed to give sufficient notice of its decision to
convert their 3211(a) motion into a motion for summary judgment and that the court had
not determined whether a class action was appropriate. Id. at 367, 391 N.E.2d at 1313, 418
N.Y.S.2d at 335-36. In response to the motion for reargument, O'Hara maintained that the
award of summary judgment should be sustained since the controversy involved only a ques-
tion of law and that the proceeding correctly was treated as a class action because the court
had found sua sponte that class relief was proper. Id.
Upholding its previous order, special term held that prior notice of the summary judg-
ment order was unnecessary because the sole issue in the case concerned a question of law
that had been argued orally and in the papers submitted on the 3211(a) motion. See id. at
367, 391 N.E.2d at 1313, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 336. The court also determined that class certifica-
tion was not required since the class was small and its members' identities were on the
record. See id.
11 O'Hara v. Del Bello, 62 App. Div. 2d 1034, 404 N.Y.S.2d 34 (2d Dep't 1978). The
second department noted that special term had erred by failing to notify the parties of its
decision to treat the defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, bat
found that the error had been cured by permitting the defendants to reargue. Id. at 1034, 404
N.Y.S.2d at 35. The appellate division reasoned that the reargument permitted the defen-
dant to litigate fully the controlling issues of law and therefore refused to reverse on procedu-
ral grounds. Id. As to the defendants' other contentions, the second department found them
"to be without merit." Id.
42 47 N.Y.2d at 368, 391 N.E.2d at 1313, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 336. The majority upheld the
appellate division's affirmance of the summary judgment award notwithstanding the trial
court's failure to comply with the notice requirements of CPLR 3211(c). Id. See generally
notes 38, 40 & 41 supra. Noting the absence of any factual dispute, the Court observed that,
on the motion to dismiss, the parties had addressed fully the sole issue in the case-a ques-
tion of statutory construction. 47 N.Y.2d at 368, 391 N.E.2d at 1313, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
Moreover, the Court stated that the defendants had not shown that they had been
prejudiced by the lack of notice. Id.
0 Judges Jasen, Wachtler, and Fuchsberg concurred with Judge Jones. Judge Gabrielli
dissented.
" 47 N.Y.2d at 368, 391 N.E.2d at 1313, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 336; see CPLR 902; note 31
supra.
[Vol. 54:382
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Court, because to allow such a determination to be made after a
resolution of the merits would be contrary to the legislative intent
of CPLR 902.11 Furthermore, Judge Jones reasoned that a disposi-
tion on the propriety of class relief made after a determination on
the merits could subject a losing party to liability beyond that con-
templated during the litigation." The Court also was hesitant to
bestow the "gratuitous" avails of a favorable adjudication upon in-
dividuals who had not been exposed to the risk of an unfavorable
decision." Finally, the majority noted that a prior disposition on
the merits could influence a court's later resolution of the class ac-
tion issue."
Dissenting, Judge Gabrielli disputed the majority's dismissal
of the claims of the other class members." Emphasizing that the
failure to certify the class was caused through no fault of the peti-
tioner,"0 Judge Gabrielli questioned the fairness of depriving the
other members of the right to recover in this action." Accordingly,
the dissent contended that the majority should have remanded to
special term for a determination on the appropriateness of class
certification.2
11 47 N.Y.2d at 368-69, 391 N.E.2d at 1313-14, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37; see THIRTEENTH
ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1975), in TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y.
JUD. CONFERENCE 252 (1976). Noting that article 9 is based upon the federal class action rule,
see FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Judge Jones stated that the "general scheme" of both procedures is to
have a disposition on the propriety of the class action "promptly . . . at the outset of the
litigation." 47 N.Y.2d at 368, 391 N.E.2d at 1313, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 336; see FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1); CPLR 901. The Court emphasized that while the federal rule requires the decision
to be made "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action," FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1), the CPLR imposes a stricter time limitation. 47 N.Y.2d at 368, 391 N.E.2d at 1313,
418 N.Y.S.2d at 336; see CPLR 902. Under CPLR 902, the class action plaintiff must move
for a hearing on the appropriateness of class action relief within 60 days after the expiration
of the defendant's time to answer. The majority concluded that CPLR 902 evidenced the
legislature's intent to have the class action issue resolved "well before any determination on
the merits of the action." 47 N.Y.2d at 369, 391 N.E.2d at 1314, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37.
11 47 N.Y.2d at 369, 391 N.E.2d at 1314, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
Id.
" Id. According to the majority, after receiving notice of the order granting class relief
without class certification, the petitioner should have requested special term to satisfy the
requirements of article 9. Id. Since he chose not to pursue this "remedy," the Court essen-
tially concluded that the petitioner forfeited any chance to demonstrate the appropriateness
of class relief. Id.
1 Id. at 371, 391 N.E.2d at 1315, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
50 Id. Judge Gabrielli noted that since the trial court had granted summary judgment
sua sponte and without notice to the parties, the petitioner had no opportunity to move for
class certification at any time prior to the final order. See id. at 370-71, 391 N.E.2d at 1315,
418 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 371-72, 391 N.E.2d at 1315-16, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
52 Id. Judge Gabrielli opined that the rationale used by the majority to dismiss the other
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It is submitted that as a general proposition, the O'Hara rule
prohibiting class certification following a judgment on the merits is
reasonable and fair.53 Nevertheless, as applied in a factual setting
similar to that of O'Hara, it is suggested that the rule may cause
unnecessarily harsh consequences. 4 Where the court converts a mo-
tion to dismiss into a summary judgment'motion, 5 and the time to
seek class certification has not yet begun to run,5" permitting class
certification at the time of or within a reasonable time after judg-
ment would seem to cause little possibility of prejudice." In such a
class members' claims also would seem to require dismissal of the claims of a litigant to
whom a court wrongfully had granted summary judgment notwithstanding the presence of a
factual dispute. Id. The dissent pointed out, however, that where a court prematurely grants
relief, the proper remedial course has always been to remand, not to dismiss. Id.
Finally, Judge Gabrielli added that a remand to decide the certification issue was not
tantamount to conferring class action status. Id. Indeed, the dissent posited that a class
action might not be appropriate in this case, especially since the class was small. Id. at 372,
391 N.E.2d at 1316, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 338-39 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting); see CPLR 901(a)(1).
" In recommending the enactment of article 9, the Judicial Conference noted that
"[p]roposed section 902 would adopt the federal policy of determining, at least tentatively,
the propriety of maintaining a class action in the initial stages of the proceedings," and that
the court would have wide discretion "to vary the order at any time before reaching a deci-
sion on the merits." THnRTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1975), in
TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 252 (1976).
" See 47 N.Y.2d at 371-72, 391 N.E.2d at 1315-16, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 338 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting); note 59 and accompanying text infra.
See CPLR 3211(c) (1976).
" A motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) extends the defendant's time to serve
a responsive pleading to 10 days "after service of notice of entry of the order." CPLR 3211(f).
The class action plaintiff, however, can seek class certification only within 60 days after the
defendant's time to answer has expired. CPLR 902; see note 31 and accompanying text
supra. Thus, in a class action, an accelerated judgment awarded under CPLR 3211(c) may
often be granted before the plaintiff has had an opportunity to move for certification.
11 It is significant to note that article 9 is based upon the federal class action statute.
CPLR art. 9, commentary at 319, 336 (McKinney 1976); THIRTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JUD.
CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1975) in TWENTY-FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 249-52
(1976); see FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Although the federal courts generally hold that class action
determination should precede the final trial on the merits, e.g., Horn v. Associated Whole-
sale Grocers, Inc., 555 F.2d 270, 274 (10th Cir. 1977); Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d
349, 354 (7th Cir. 1975), some courts have permitted post-judgment certification where the
suit had been commenced and had proceeded to trial as a class action, and the defendants
had been aware throughout the proceedings that the plaintiffs were seeking relief on behalf
of a class, e.g., Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1371-72 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 520-22 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 697-99 (7th Cir.
1975); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441, 445-47 (5th Cir. 1973); Haas v. Pitts-
burgh Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 801, 803-06 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified on other grounds, 526
F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975); cf. Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 354 (7th Cir. 1975)
(post-judgment certification disallowed where plaintiff, over defendants' objections, actively
sought adjudication on merits prior to certification).
Since the certification order under CPLR 902 may be altered or amended before the
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situation, the defendant has reason to know that a class may be
certified; it is suggested, therefore, that only where a defendant can
show actual prejudice should the relief granted be limited to the
named plaintiff."
Moreover, the O'Hara decision severely weakens the utility of
the class action device by affording the defendant a possible escape
from liability to the remainder of the putative class." Indeed, the
result reached in O'Hara may encourage some defendants served
with a class action complaint to use the motion to dismiss only to
preempt class certification. The Court is exhorted, therefore, to




CPLR 1007: Second department permits third-party claim for
damages in excess of sum demanded in plaintiff's complaint
CPLR 1007 permits a defendant to implead a nonparty "who is
or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
decision on the merits on the court's own motion or on motion of the parties, CPLR 902; see
note 31 supra, certification at the time summary judgment is granted under CPLR 3211(c)
could be seen as an extension of the wide discretion the court has on the certification issue.
See generally THIRTEENTH ANN. REP. OF THE JuD. CONFERENCE ON THE CPLR (1975), in
TWENTY-FST ANN. REP. N.Y. Jun. CONFERENCE 252 (1976). See also Jimenez v. Weinberger,
523 F.2d 689, 697 (7th Cir. 1975).
Furthermore, it is submitted that since the class action and the accelerated judgment
serve similar purposes, the two devices should be permitted to achieve most effectively their
intended functions. The summary judgment procedure enables the courts to avoid needless
litigation in cases where the issues are merely superficial. Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361,
364, 320 N.E.2d 853, 854, 362 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (1974); Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N.Y.
346, 350, 152 N.E. 110, 111 (1926). Permitting several claims to be sued upon in one proceed-
ing, the class action also reduces the burdens on the judicial system. Homberger, State Class
Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 609-11 (1971).
-" See Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1371-72 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S.946 (1978); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 520-22 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 697-99 (7th Cir.
1975).
11 One of the intended functions of the class action is to allow many individuals with
small claims to share the otherwise prohibitive costs of the litigation with others similarly
situated. See SIEGEL § 139, at 173. Following the decision in O'Hara, it is possible that ex-
pense will deter any other class member from initiating a subsequent action, thus enabling a
wrongdoer to escape substantial liability to the balance of the actual class members.
